The army of Gen Hooker is again on the north side of the Rappahannock. It began to recross the river Tuesday afternoon, and was all over on Wednesday morning. The troops were annoyed considerably by the firing of the rebels from the neighboring hights, and there were some casualties, but the accounts go to indicate ihat the passage of the river was made in good order and with admirable success under the circumstances. The first reports of the retreat stated that it was preceded by a severe battle and defeat of our forces on Tuesday, but later accounts deny that there was any battle on that day, and state that the army was deliberately withdrawn from prudential reasons. Some have already made haste to charge Gen Hooker with cowardice in ordering this retreat, but it is too soon, and the facts are too imperfectly known, to make a just judgment in the matter possible, and it is quite likely to appear that Gen Hooker has demonstrated by the movement that he is a prudent leader, as he has already shown himself a bold one.
These are some obvious reasons for the retreat. Heavy rains had softened the roads, and the rivers were rapidly rising. It was probable that these difficulties would increase to such an extent that retreat might become extremely difficult, or even impossible, when it might become necessary to the preservation of the army. Besides, the rebels had recovered possession of the hights along the river, and were already threatening Gen Hooker’s connections, which he could not make secure. The enemy were being reinforced by way of Gordonsville, and Gen Hooker had not been informed of the succeses of Gen Stoneman’s cavalry in destroying the railroad connections with Richmond. Probably he did not know that Gen Heintzleman was coming to his aid from Washington with thirty thousand fresh troops. All these considerations united must have had great weight.
But we presume that notwithstanding the storm and the expulsion of Sedgwick’s corps from Fredericksburg, and the manifest difficulties of defending his communications, Gen Hooker would not have retreated if the battles of Saturday and Sunday had not gone heavily against him, and left his army much crippled and in an exposed condition. We may credit the reports that in those battles the enemy lost more than we did, but we know that on Saturday Gen Hooker’s army was driven from an excellent position, commanding the road to Gordonsville, and that he only in part regained by Sunday’s battles the ground lost on Saturday, and did not regain the control of the Gordonville road so as to prevent the reinforcement of the enemy. We know also that he left many of his dead and wounded in the hands of the enemy. It also appears that after the battles of Sunday he did not resume the offensive, but was continually pressed upon and harrassed by the enemy, until the question came to be, not how to destroy the enemy, but how to save his own army. It is pretty evident that the enemy were stronger in numbers and had also the advantage of perfect familiarity with the region, in which they were operating, and they were handled with great skill by their generals. The men of both armies fought with well-matched courage and obstinacy, and Gen Hooker had no reason to expect success except by superiority of numeral strength or of position. It be came his duty therefore to extricate his army from its dangerous position, and there is reason for satisfaction and gratitude that he succeeded in doing it. He crossed the river with perfect knowledge of the great hazards of such an experiment if he erred it was in too sanguine an estimate of the chances of success. If the battle at Chancellorsville on Saturday had been a victory, instead of a defeat, Gen Hooker might have followed it up quickly to decisive results. What he hoped for was prompt success. His chances turned wholly on celerity of movement and speedy triumph. If after the battles of Saturday and Sunday, Sedgwick had been able to hold Fredericksburg, the situation would have been different. No one of those things above justifies the retreat of Hooker, perhaps but together they make a combination of circumstances sufficient to create a necessity.
The enemy have followed Hooker to the river, and are moving to his right, as if looking again with desire towards Bull Run and Washington. But they will only look.—There will probably be quiet on the Rappahannock again till the flood subsides, and till the merits of Gen Hooker’s first campaign as commander of the army of the Potomac have been thoroughly discussed.—Springfield Republican
The Caledonian, St. Johnsbury, VT